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Abstract: This paper aims at describing the manner through which both Brazil and China 
have invested in the defense economy as an instrument for national development. It 
assumes that investments in the industrial sectors can leverage the full productive chains 
of the civilian economy, based on the premise that the impact of defense economics is 
also responsible for spillovers and spin-offs that are not purely economic. In this sense, 
our hypothesis is that the Chinese and the Brazilian economic models have important 
synergies as a useful scope for bilateral initiatives engaged in the principle of expanding 
infrastructure, together with the international ties that make development possible. We 
have explored official government documents and reviewed the literature that works with 
the topics, besides mapping the main cooperation programs between both countries. 
Following the introduction, we analyze the Chinese model first, and the Brazilian model 
next. We then assess the programs and cooperation initiatives between the countries, 
which are followed by conclusion points. 
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Introduction 
The debate surrounding military expenditure has generally showed an antagonism 
towards other civilian investments, such as in education, public health, and retirement 
pensions. Why should a country choose to strengthen its defense platform, projecting 
public policies that might be not visible in attending to society’s basic needs? That is a 
common question that public authorities have to deal with. 
 There are several ramifications to this discussion, one of which is the political 
arguments of how safety, security, and defense are interrelated as factors required for a 
nation’s growth. States can cooperate, but have to be prepared in case of war or conflict. 
National sovereignty is seen as an asset that has to be protected in order for the entire 
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governmental structure to work. Even countries which see themselves as naturally 
defensive should not abdicate having strong armed forces. 
 On the other hand, there are academic works based on econometric parameters 
that propose links between the defense economy and the development of a country itself 
(Hartley, 2007; Joerding, 1986; Ram, 2007). In this context, two realities are considered: 
first, the one in which military expenditures increase other productive chains and this, as 
such the defense economy, is a trigger for economic growth. There is also the possibility 
that economic growth facilitates and actually demands better armies and defense 
technologies so as to guarantee that the nation is not hindered in its development.  
A major issue concerning defense economics is whether the investments can be 
transferred to civilians as peace dividends, or if they have to be maintained in other to 
guarantee the status of the actor and act as a deterrent. Considering that the environment 
in which investors, states, and firms operate in defense is quite sensitive, and is dependent 
on state financies and subsidies, growth and development may create significant concern 
in terms of public good.  This is a point of relevance, because the dedicated budget for 
the sector may suffer from significant pressure from public opinion. If, during the 1970s 
and 1980s, studies tried to figure out how to measure growth from defense spending, from 
the 1990s, scholars would be dedicated to understanding how the reduction in defense 
spending after the Cold War would generate space for growth in terms of changing 
investments.  
At the same pace - even though controversial, depending on the economic model 
used - economists dedicated to the subject agreed on the point that defense investments 
(as well as civilian) induce growth (Hartley & Sandler, 2007; Joerding, 1986; Ram, 1995). 
So, even if the investments are guaranteed in terms of peace dividends or periods of 
defense budget growth, they may generate an impact in the economic performance of a 
country. Incrementalism is also part of the theoretical approach absorbed here because of 
its considered effect in small amounts and progressively in time, permitting spillovers to 
other sectors and technology developments (Mintz & Stevenson, 1995).  
 Our argument is that Brazil and China are partners in this debate considering, in 
recent years, defense spending and infrastructure investments as an asset for 
development. Both of them are seen as developing countries, dealing with basic 
challenges such as social inequality, technological impediments, and high international 
trade dependence. Both of them wish to become self-sufficient societies, with a good-
level of employment and strong national industries. They are also dependent on natural 
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resources, whose security is unstable and compromising. Brazil’s oil industry, its 
hydropower potential, and its biodiversity are elements which require the attention of the 
state. The same situation is true with China, a country highly dependent on imports of 
natural resources which demand an energy supply infrastructure. Growth and defense are, 
once more, together, connecting development investments and the overall defense 
planning. 
 In this paper, we try to outline how the Chinese and the Brazilian governments 
understand their national development (henceforth, their defense investments and status). 
We propose an analysis of the official documents and a review of the literature on the 
topic, observing the impacts of the development policies on the sector and the ties 
promoted among them. In the following sections, we describe both models in view of the 
cooperation between China and Brazil and in sectors that might be considered strategic 
to both perspectives on national development.  
 
The Chinese model 
One of the main findings of this study is that the defense economy in China is a 
mechanism that integrates three main aspects to the country’s national development: first, 
military-civilian relations in both the political realm and the industrial sector; then, a focus 
on scientific and technological research in the consolidation of an innovation system; and 
finally, the power projection by weapons development and exports to key strategic 
partners. Through a literature review and the assessment of official publications, the link 
between defense and development is revealed as promising and positive. 
This section thus tries to establish and explain how the defense industry came to 
be one of the key determinants of growth in China. It labels the sector as a fundamental 
driver of both innovation and the formation of productivity around the country. The main 
argument is that military expenditures demand changes in interrelated civilian industries, 
such as telecommunications, energy, and infrastructure. As China becomes a great world 
power, it needs to ensure a continuous flow of raw materials and food. The military not 
only absorbs that, but in turn stimulates industrial production. 
One of the most important authors that writes about the Chinese defense economy, 
its origins and impacts, is Professor Tai Ming Cheung of the University of California 
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and School of Global Policy and Strategy. 
In his book Fortifying China, The Struggle to Build a Modern Defense Economy (2008) 
he explores themes such as the integration between the civilian and defense economies; 
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the national innovation systems framework; the defense industrial base; the relationship 
between the defense and national innovation systems; the dual-use economy; techno-
nationalism; and development models.  
An important concept studied by the author is the political economy of security, 
which focuses on the nexus between elements such as technological innovation, 
economic development, and defense modernization. This approach investigates the place 
occupied by the defense economy within a country’s economic, military and 
technological transformation. One should note that the term “defense economy” used by 
Cheung is primarily related nowadays to the defense technology and industrial base – 
although it very much focused on the arms race and deterrence during the Cold War. 
Therefore, elements of technology and industry are connected in an analysis of how the 
defense economy contributes to China’s national development. 
 In this sense, the Chinese strategy and model for economic development has long 
been adjusted to include the defense industry. Both the military and the science and 
technology sectors are underpinned by a well-planned regulatory system, which allows 
for an integration between the defense industry and the development of social economy 
(Xiaoge & Wenbo, 2014). Civil-military integration has been a top priority for Chinese 
officials since the late 1970s and the defense enterprises, owned by the state, show 
expansive commercial interests, domestically and abroad. An example of that is the closer 
relationships developed by civilian manufacturers with government research institutes 
and universities – the military supply network depends thus on important players such as 
civilian high-tech firms (Medeiros & Trebat, 2013). 
Such a connection was formalized by the Four Modernizations Program, first 
elaborated by Zhou Enlai in 1963 and concluded by Deng Xiaoping in 1976. National 
defense has since become an essential part of the opening-up policies that led to market 
reforms. Furthermore, as Bildirici (2016) states, China’s defense sector is an effect of its 
economic growth, changing dramatically since the late-1990s. Medeiros and Trebat 
(2013) highlight the significance of the “technological economy” in the reform era of 
China. According to them, focusing on economic development intensively transformed 
the military-industrial complex of the country: Chinese leaders have, from the beginning, 
prioritized national defense in the distribution of supplies and skilled labor.  
Two elements are key to understanding the integration between the defense 
industry and Chinese economic development. The first one is the civilian-military 
interaction that allows for military technologies to be applied in regular market activities. 
Sabrina Evangelista Medeiros, Rita de Cassia Oliveira JCIR Special Issue (2018) 
Feodrippe, & Laura Martucci Benvenuto 
78 
The second one relates to the innovation system created by China in the past 30 years, 
which evolved around scientific research for indigenous production. In recent years, 
China’s efforts to promote technological upgrading is much related to military scientific 
research, which has assumed a central role in integrating licensed foreign technology with 
indigenous innovation – specifically focusing on microelectronics (Medeiros & Trebat, 
2013). 
Following the United States’ experience, Beijing has pursued the integration of 
the development of the social economy and the construction of national defense, 
improving the regulations system which encouraged private companies to build an 
effective technology transfer process (Xiaoge & Wenbo, 2014). This has been 
accompanied by major results in the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army, 
turning the country’s military force a case of successful remodeling.  
Cheung (1988) identifies that there is a close link between the military and 
economic development, so that the military is at the heart of China’s economy. This is 
due to the great allocation of resources demanded by the sector, especially in terms of 
industrial and technological assets. The author shows an interest in the political economy 
of security and focuses on the nexus between economic development, technological 
innovation, and defense modernization in China, which concerns the place of the defense 
economy in the country’s economic, technological, and military transformation. For him, 
the dual-use economy acts as a bridge between the defense economy and the broader 
civilian economy. The establishment of a civil-military dual-use economy has been the 
continuous effort of the government since the 1990s. 
The integration of the defense economy scope into the broader civilian economy 
is a necessary premise to forming a dual-use technological and industrial base (Cheung, 
2008). The author argues that the establishment of a vibrant dual-use economy provides 
a valuable opportunity for the defense economy to gain access to advanced technologies, 
knowledge, techniques, and practices. Today’s leaders face the same conundrum of how 
to pursue prosperity while ensuring the country’s military might. Forging a mutually 
beneficial relationship between the competing interests of wealth and power is crucial for 
ensuring sustainable long-term growth and security (Cheung, 2008). 
Cheung (2008) tells us that indigenization has become a crucial component of 
Chinese thinking on the relationship between technology, national security, and economic 
prosperity, which is sometimes referred to as techno-nationalism. China’s latest 
investments over the last three decades have resulted in a defense economy that, today, is 
Sabrina Evangelista Medeiros, Rita de Cassia Oliveira JCIR Special Issue (2018) 
Feodrippe, & Laura Martucci Benvenuto 
79 
decidedly dual-use in nature (Cheung, 2008). At the heart of his book is the relationships 
among technology, innovation, national security, and the country’s development 
trajectory. The author presents the concept of the national innovation system as a useful 
approach that views technological development and innovation as a constantly evolving 
process. 
Therefore, in the last thirty years, the separation between military investments and 
civilian research and development (R&D) have become a useless approach. China has a 
clear idea of its need for national security in order to maintain economic growth and 
society’s levels of improvement - as can be seen in Barbosa (2017). It became almost 
impossible to separate the achievements of high-technology groups (companies, 
universities, or R&D institutes) and the benefic effects anticipated by the armed forces. 
In order to complement the ideas previously outlined, it is necessary to analyze 
what the official documents show. From the main Chinese White Papers published by the 
State Council, some general ideas may be highlighted as strategic directives that guide 
the Communist Party’s political choices on how to drive the economy. The official 
document on the country's Peaceful Development (2011b) establishes that China sees the 
development of science and technology as an essential factor for guiding economic and 
social development. Industrialization must seek to build innovation centers all around 
Chinese territory. Based on the high-technology scope of the military sector, the defense 
economy pushes the country’s modernization in important industries such as aviation, 
spacecraft, and telecommunications. In return, robust armed forces are necessary to 
uphold China’s national security, making it feasible for the Chinese nation to pursue its 
peaceful development and rejuvenation.  
China's White Paper on the country's Military Strategy (2015) states that the 
growth of national interests generates a vulnerability in its national security situation. A 
strong military is seen as key to making the country both safe and strong, allowing it to 
deal with old and new threats without jeopardizing fundamental Chinese assets. The 
“civil-military integration”4 is treated as a concept under the principle of combining 
military efforts with civilian purposes. It goes beyond asserting that stronger policy 
support is required for China to establish uniform military and civilian standards for 
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infrastructure, key technological areas, and other major industries, which shows the 
compatibility and complementary aspects of these elements.  
This idea is enhanced by the National Defense White Paper of 2010 (2011a), 
which defines that economic development and national defense building are taken into 
consideration simultaneously by the state. It highlights the development achieved in 
information infrastructure as an example of successful civilian-military integration: a 
national defense optical fiber communications network was used as a primary element 
for the formation of a new generation information transmission network, assisting the 
communication sector performance. The document also stresses that Chinese defense has 
been integrated with social and economic development, in a way that priority has been 
given to major infrastructure projects required by national defense. Industries, 
technologies, and products have been optimized, which becomes clear in the seventh 
section called “Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense”.  
The development model of defense-related industries has been transformed from 
one that used to focus on military demands and supply chains as a segregated activity, to 
one that understands economic efforts as complex, synergic, and interrelated.  In this 
sense, enterprises and institutions are now well regulated and encourage the use of civilian 
industrial capabilities and social capital, in order to conduct research into the production 
of weaponry and equipment. The goal is to strengthen basic and applied research in 
defense-related science and technology, so that innovations can be facilitated and 
incorporated into the industrial complex. Fields such as aeronautics and space, electronic 
information, special and high technologies, and energy and nuclear power have strategic 
significance and receive financial stimulus from the government to develop key projects 
and capabilities. The principle of coordinating the development of national defense and 
the economy is in line with the decisions of China to appropriating defense expenditure 
in accordance with the country’s strategic needs. 
The last government publication examined is the one which outlines the 
Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces (2013), presenting the view that 
Chinese armed forces support key infrastructure projects, elevating advantages in 
hydroelectric, transportation, engineering, and cartographic units. This also applies to the 
support of national and local infrastructure construction, which relates to the national 
economy and people’s livelihood in areas such as transportation, water conservancy, 
energy, and communications. 
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It is, therefore, possible to understand that the government's initiatives have been 
traced as drivers for the modernization of the Chinese defense economy. Levesque and 
Stokes (2016) identified a trend in which advances in the defense sector support economic 
development through the means of civil-military integration. The residual benefits of 
integrating R&D in the military and civilian fields has been a strategy of every Chinese 
leader from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping. 
 
The Brazilian model 
Brazilian development policies are marked by what was called "desenvolvimentismos" – 
the old and new development waves, characterized by policies held mainly during the 
1930s and 1950s/1960s. In this sense, national development has been the focus for a 
considerable period in which the challenge was to occupy the territory with a great level 
of autonomy and by proposing defense and security as a plan for national unity. Indeed, 
national development planning during the last 15 years in Brazil had the same approach 
of spreading development throughout the national territory and guaranteeing space for 
integration and cooperation.   
In order to understand the recent Brazilian defense policy, it is necessary to 
observe two aspects that have relevance in this analysis: the defense industry sector, 
which was already ranked fifth internationality among exporters in the early 1980s; and 
the development debate as part of the actual Brazilian economic framework. According 
to a report published in 2015 by Senator Ricardo Ferraço from the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations and National Defense, the Defense National Policy (Política de Defesa 
Nacional) - originally from 1996, revised in 2005 - gave rise to the National Defense 
Strategy and the National Defense White Paper, the first documents to establish a general 
compromise in between defense and development. Despite the political and economic 
crisis that affected Brazil in 2017, the latest versions of the documents, the National 
Defense Policy (renamed the Política Nacional de Defesa), the National Defense Strategy 
(Estratégia Nacional de Defesa) and the White Paper on National Defense (Livro Branco 
de Defesa Nacional) gave ample room for the development of the defense sector through 
the expansion of its capacities, as well as to promote Brazilian productive and 
technological autonomy, in order to broaden Brazil’s international insertion and ensure 
the greater involvement of Brazilian society in these matters. 
The Brazilian National Defense White Paper introduced the Plano de Articulação 
e Equipamento de Defesa, the general plan for the integration of the armed forces in terms 
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of logistics, procurement, and interoperability. Even though it was developed before the 
Ministry of Defense was put into operation, the defense catalog for logistics turned out to 
be one of the most important demands of the objectives associated with making the 
defense sector more effective, efficient, and sustainable over the following decades. The 
insertion of Brazilian companies and products in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
(NATO) catalog system is one of the recent changes in the protocols that organize not 
only the Ministry’s procurement processes, but the whole industry’s contributions. This 
impacts the total value chain, standardizing the defense sector. The Brazilian Defense 
Catalog (Catálogo de Empresas de Interesse da Defesa) had close to 4000 national 
companies in the NATO catalog system, 420 economic activities which are directly 
considered of interest to the defense sector, and more than sixty-six thousand products 
were introduced in the same system.  
Another main aspect of the Defense White Paper is the strategic plans associated 
with the main investments that are programed to be of a huge number of investments. De 
Souza and Oliveira (2017) organized a scheme identified the following projects: the Navy 
nuclear program; the nuclear submarine construction; the Blue Amazon Monitoring 
System (Sistema de Gerenciamento da Amazônia Azul); the recovery of the operational 
capacity of the Army (Programa de Recuperação da Capacidade Operacional da Força 
Terrestre); cyber defense; the Territorial Border Monitoring System (Sistema de 
Monitoramento de Fronteiras Terrestres); the Integrated Protection System of the 
Strategic Structures (Sistema Integrado de Proteção de Estruturas Estratégicas 
Terrestres); the anti-air defense system; the missile and rockets systems (ASTROS 2020); 
the modernization of the AM-X and F-5; the operational capacitation of the Brazilian Air 
Force; and finally, airspace and defense robustness (cargo plane KC-390). For the 
authors, the “technological imperative” is the element that makes Brazilian projects 
around defense, opening space for a different perspective on the core structures which 
uphold the Brazilian development plan.  
This is part of a general policy that benefits from a possible view of the future due 
to the continuity of the present conjecture or due to innovation processes that would lead 
Brazil to new positions in the international arena. In this sense, Brasil 3 tempos was a 
document that gathered propositions on Brazil’s future from a long-term planning 
perspective, as part of the directive of a state policy to be consolidated beyond the current 
political arena in the subsequent years of 2007, 2015, and 2022. Assuming a pragmatic 
view of the needs for institutional governance enhancement in Brazil, in both private and 
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public institutions, the project brought together specialists from statistics and applied 
economics, and federal institutes as well as from universities, to face the problem of 
Brazilian development in an effort to achieve the simplification and acceleration of the 
planned processes.  
The main understanding behind this view, as is shown in the document, is that 
there is what is called a “natural scenario” that has to be modified while suffering 
interference from actors. The interpretation of the conjecture as formed by the actors’ 
behavior is similar to that from the international relations theoretical framework from 
which Brazil has been acting in terms of foreign policy. The model used was based on 
the European Union prospective model, where there is a need for thinking and debating, 
but also modelling the future.  
As some of the outputs, the Lula government’s productive development plan 
(Política de Desenvolvimento Produtivo, 2008) and Dilma’s “plan on a greater Brazil” 
(Plano Brasil Maior, 2011) were part of the consensus on the inclusion of defense matters 
into a broader view of state policies on growth (Pacheco & Pedone, 2017). It is worth 
noting that Brazil’s main understanding of the defense sector could reach companies from 
the defense industrial base, but also other industries associated with primary and 
secondary raw materials, as well as those from infrastructure.  
In terms of the Brazilian international reputation, Rafael Villa (2017) calls for a 
“hybrid behavior” of the Brazilian foreign policy in defense and security matters. This 
may happen for two main reasons: first, Brazil can be viewed as a regional leader or it is 
absorbed by internationalization intentions; second, its military modernization process 
addresses intentions other than that of maintaining a peaceful regional status, much more 
“interpreted like a typical balance of power practice”. On the other hand, Burges (2013) 
argued that Brazil is a possible bridge between small powers or sub-regional actors from 
the South and those from the North, as it occupies the place of a non-contesting actor in 
the international system, trying to open windows of opportunity to a broader participation.  
While Villa (2017) pointed out the dichotomy associated with this view on the 
defense burden and development versus integration through peaceful means, Burges 
(2013) provoked readers by indicating that the Brazilian discourse on solidarity is part of 
a project of being the bridge, instead of just acting inside the region. Malamud (2011) had 
before stated that the “mis-match between the global performance and regional 
performance” had put Brazil in a growing divergence dilemma. In the author’s view, 
although this foreign policy behavior had led to Brazil facing problems in terms of real 
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leadership in the region, at the same time, some of the regional and global motivations 
had proved to be the way to a progressive recognition in the international scene. In 
Malamud’s perspective, also, Brazil’s intentions on military and economic apparatuses 
were insufficient to foster those projects’ hold in both regional and international scopes.  
So, insufficiency seems to be measured by the difference between the levels of 
development required for the growing of the national economic status, and also the 
robustness of the national economy so as to promote integration, internationalization, and 
technical cooperation. So as to boost foreign policy programs, economic development 
requires the capacity of sharing and provoking change overseas. In spite of the volatile 
economic status of Brazil, which deals permanently with political and economic 
variations, there is the belief that natural resources and geographical potentialities would 
require more emphasis on planning, defending, and projecting Brazilian interests over 
and above those past achievements.  
The key movements to overtaking this status were concentrated on technological 
improvements and innovative thinking between the government and the industries that 
took place, surprising as it may seem, under both liberalization and national incentives 
(Faé, Goulart & Zilio Abdala, 2016). Liberalization is marked by competitiveness under 
market rules and in terms of internationalization and the maintenance of the international 
labor division; the focus on national incentives is because of the social policies 
undertaken, but also, it is relevant for the fiscal and financial incentives towards national 
industry to work together with the government in such tight relations that maintained the 
unveiled unethical and corrupt relations between the private and public actors.  
 The movement around institutional reforming inside the Ministry of Defense was 
proposed by Dagnino (2009) to be neither a rational, nor an incremental, process. He 
observes that the management of the changes in course was in some way controlled by a 
technical framework, but also from incremental political change. Dagnino (2008b) 
maintains that the visibility that defense investments may have in terms of development 
is because of some important findings in the spin-off processes that induce civilian 
developments derived from defense investments, especially after war. Although his view 
on defense investments is based on the recognition of possible spin-offs, he reinforces the 
fact that the progress associated with those investments must be thought about from a 
perspective that correlates the needs and fragilities of a democratic state with those 
incentives.  
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 Through ties of technological improvement and innovation, in recent years 
liberalization took place as part of a national economic development plan, at the same 
time as the whole economy was suffering from high debt and very low growth rates. As 
an example, the integration of energy security and defense planning was progressively 
rising and was in parallel with the opening investments around the recently discovered 
oil reserves in the deep seas pre-salt region in the Brazilian Economic Exclusive Zone’s 
waters. The recent legislation (Lei 4567/16) that permits foreign investors to exploit the 
pre-salt oil reserves is under the same policy developments that opened space for foreign 
investors in the Brazilian defense industries and companies (debates about whether it 
should or not are not considered here). Recognizing the limits for Brazilian investors and 
the opportunities for the sector, with high levels of investments, leads Brazil to achieve 
other steps in the international system, although it reveals in some way the insufficiency 
of the national market and, as a consequence, the country’s lost national autonomy.  
 Brazilian progress in the defense industry sector could not be made without this 
combination of international-liberalism and development economics, benefiting from 
both foreign investment and the national enhancement of local investors and 
entrepreneurs. This dichotomy was in some way surpassed with the practice of a formula 
that would gather incentives from enhancing the Brazilian presence and power to the 
scope of social development that was in place in at least the last 12 years. At this point, 
we should mark that the failure of the liberal policies, decades before, however, marked 
the presence of new industrial relations with a recovering class of national businessman 
(Diniz & Bresser-Pereira, 2013).   
Subsequently, the economic crisis affecting the most developed states presented 
emerging markets as an alternative for new investments and the repositioning of the flow 
of investments. There comes a transition process in which development would be the 
output, but also the model from the investment’s perspective (Diniz & Bresser-Pereira, 
2013). A mechanism to achieve progress through provoking development and opening 
new sources of investments, as opposed to the pre-existing arrangements and frameworks, 
would be considered the way of dealing with less than ideal economic conditions.  
If autonomy was not conquered without considering the macroeconomic factors 
that are straightforwardly imposed by international markets and the governing paradigms, 
new forms of states’ relationship could arise from those findings – the BRICS (Brazil-
Russia-India-China-South Africa) as an alternative will be addressed later. As opposed to 
the order in place, those new arrangements consolidated new forms and strategies to 
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survive – even under the established economic crisis. Therefore, arrangements were, as it 
was said before, overlapping, and they could not meet the needs due to economic 
limitations.  One measure that could be cited as a domestic rearrangement that could be 
seen inside this transition would be the enhancement of inter-agencies’ ties and projects. 
Next, the existence of para-diplomatic programs (including the federalists, but also those 
from sources other than the Ministry of Foreign Relations), had guaranteed the 
maintenance of thematic or residual projects on technical cooperation that would finally 
represent a scope of dealing with lower investments and take advantage of the structures 
already in place.  
That is why and how the defense development model arose together with 
development. Not only through the trust in spin-offs and spill-over effects on the civilian 
side, but from the perspective that new sources of indirect foreign policy could share 
bigger values and have an expressive impact on the national economy. Noticing that 
established frameworks on specific matters could guarantee future developments on 
South-South cooperation, the state bureaucracy has contributed to this wave, supporting 
the various initiatives all around state’s institutions.  
 
The partnerships and joint projects 
In the 1980s, Latin America was marked by an economic crisis and, in this context, the 
Sino-Brazilian relationship became more dense. Although there was an imprecise 
context, Brazil and China observed this as a possibility to act jointly in overcoming these 
barriers. The convergence of interests regarding the multilateral sphere was a stimulus, 
but also raised the possibility of establishing a strategic agenda to face the traditional 
system. Through that agenda, it was possible to increase the relationship and intensify  
academic and political knowledge about each other. Between the years of 1980 and 1990, 
China passed through a political orientation called “pragmatic”, in which it was 
characterized by its non-alignment with the great powers and the beginning of a 
multilateral dialogue, which progressively gained importance in the country’s politics, 
and this orientation would guide its interests in Latin America.  
 Under changes since the 2000s, the geopolitical and global financial system has 
changed, and the rise of China - as well the emergence of countries like Brazil, India, and 
Russia - shifted the global economy centered in the United States. These changes are 
important for the understanding of the flexible multiple faceted inter-state relations that 
have emerged. According to Cintra (2013), the Chinese interests in Latin America are 
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growing, especially in 2000s, based on four main motivations: the first one would be the 
search for primary products that are plentiful in the region; secondly, the region offers a 
market to export Chinese products; third, to isolate Taiwan from the recognition of its 
independence; and fourth, to ensure “strategic partners” to increase China’s influence in 
the region (Cintra, 2013: 30-31). 
 China’s interest in Brazil is related to the movement of the Chinese foreign policy 
that focused on new market opportunities, so as to increase the quality and quantity of its 
exports. On the other side, Brazil anticipated an opportunity to use this relationship as a 
mechanism for reducing its dependence on North-South relations. Brazil is also 
considered a good partner in terms of information sharing, producing, and acquiring 
advanced technologies (Becard, 2013). Taking Becard (2013) into consideration, Brazil 
is seen as an important player in South America and China is seen as the central pivot in 
Asia, which may provide an alternative to Brazil’s intentions of cooperation within the 
traditional world trade framework.  
Brazil is privileged with agricultural areas, energy resources, and opportunities in 
an important range of economic sectors. Because of that, it is interesting for China to 
invest in infrastructure as a way to achieve more assertiveness in trade, as well as it is 
important for Brazil to guarantee its domestic development. Brazil is capable of attracting 
good commercial relations with other countries based on the diversification of its market 
- 80% of the region’s companies are Brazilian and they have an important role in 
development and the environment. In this regard, the Sino-Brazilian relationship has 
achieved an important position in the international arena, such as in cooperation in 
economic areas.   
Considering the motives exemplified above, the table below contains some 
bilateral agreements that were promulgated between Brazil and China, focused on the 
defense and strategic sectors. These agreements can be seen as markers of the beginning 
of the Sino-Brazilian relationship. 
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Table 1 – Agreements on defense sector 
Name Date of promulgation 
Protocol of Cooperation in the Area of Industrial Technology March 9 1990 
Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation August 24 1992 
Agreement between the Government of the Federative 
Republic of Brazil and the Government of the People's 
Republic of China on technical security related to the joint 
development of Earth Resources Satellite 
July 29 1998 
Agreement on cooperation in peaceful applications of space 
science and technology between the Government of Brazil 
and the Government of the People's Republic of China 
July 30 1998 
Agreement for the Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of 
Nuclear Energy 
January 14 1998 
Source: http://www.cebc.org.br/pt-br/dados-e-estatisticas/acordos-bilaterais. 
    
 According to Cunha (2016), Ambassador Roberto Abdenur increased steps to 
strengthen the Brazil-China bilateral relationship. Visits were gradually established and, 
in 1982, an agreement on the subject of science and technology was mutually signed. 
Then, President José Sarney negotiated other agreements in the areas of industrial 
technology, energy, and pharmaceuticals in 1988, but the most important result of the 
negotiations was the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) project in the area 
of satellites (Cunha, 2016: 73). The signing of the protocol that later embodied the project 
itself represented an important area that both countries were intending to develop, 
involving high value-added technology.  
The success of this program meant that Brazil and China were seeking 
independence in relation to the “developed countries” in the matter of technology transfer, 
representing a new structure of South-South cooperation. The project CBERS established 
a novel model of cooperation that, on the Brazilian side, contributed to technological 
modernization, and for China, served as instrument to develop the country’s productive 
forces, such as defense, energy, and infrastructure.  
 The cooperation in the scientific and technological sectors is one of the field’s 
most developed at different levels between Brazil and China; it is extremely important 
for Brazil to improve its knowledge on the theme through China, as it continues to be a 
technological tool which impacts other areas like agriculture, human resources, and the 
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environment. The “China-Brazil Climate Change and Energy Innovative Technologies 
Center” was created as an academic and technological cooperation instrument between 
Tsinghua University in China and the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil 
(Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro), to study climate change and energy sources 
and applicability.  
There is also the “Binational Brazil-China Center of Nanotechnology”, a bilateral 
cooperation project between the Brazilian Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Innovation and the Chinese Sciences Academy (Becard, 2013). The Chinese Academy of 
Agricultural Sciences has an international department of cooperation and one of its 
partners is Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária. The different levels of sector 
cooperation have been increasing over the last few decades, and areas such as 
biotechnology, data processing, the development of new materials, joint action to 
eradicate HIV/AIDS, and pharmaceutical remedies etc. are expanding (Oliveira, 2010).  
 In 1993, the “Strategic Partnership” between Brazil and China was formalized. In 
terms of foreign policy, this increase of degree was announced unilaterally by President 
Jiang Zemin, and it represented the political consolidation of the mutual strengthening. 
In 2012, this partnership was increased to a level of “Global Strategic Partnership” and 
new intergovernmental dialogues were established. The creation of the COSBAN 
(Comissão Sino-Brasileira de Alto Nível de Concertação e Cooperação) in 2010 was 
“aimed at promoting the highest strategic level, development policies at economic, 
commercial, financial, scientific and technological academic and cultural levels” (Pires, 
Paulino, Cunha, 2015: 151) and the Global Strategic Dialogue contributed to the 
advancing of these interests.  
There is also the Plano Decenal de Cooperação (Ten-Year Cooperation Plan) 
2012-2012 and the Plano de Ação Conjunta (Joint Action Plan) 2015-2021, that provides 
strategic goals to guide the bilateral relationship objectives. The Brazil-China Business 
Council promotes dialogue between the most important companies in both countries. The 
similarity of the foreign policy agendas between Brazil and China facilitates the 
development of joint policies and the establishment of this high-level dialogue indicates 
the advancing of cooperation that has expanded over forty years of relations.  
The table below is the resume of plans and initiatives between Brazil and China 
that were exemplified in the article. 
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Table 2 – Resume of Plans and Initiatives of Cooperation 
Plans and Initiatives Year 
China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite 1988 
China-Brazil Business Council 2004 
China-Brazil Climate Change and Energy Innovative 
Technologies Center 
2009 
BRICS 2009 
COSBAN 2012 
Ten-Year Cooperation Plan 2012-2021 
Binational Brazil-China Center of Nanotechnology 2014 
Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences - 
Joint Action Plan 2015-2021 
Source: compiled by the authors. 
 
 The dialogue between Brazil and China has also advanced in a multilateral 
dimension - that is in the cases of the BRICS and the G-20, in order to broaden their long-
term joint plans to other countries. The democratization of the access to resources, before 
concentrated in the International Monetary Fund or World Bank, is now happening 
through the mechanism of the BRICS, and its influence on global economic development 
is already visible. In addition, there are plenty of opportunities for Brazil to increase its 
position in the international scenario and China will continue to have an important part 
in this achievement. “Fortunately, the economical asymmetry between Brazil and China, 
has been accompanied of [sic] mechanisms of bilateral and plurilateral dialogues” 
(Rosito, 2015: 62-63) which has allowed solutions to some of the principal challenges 
presented. The initiatives, agreements, and joint plans have the potential to transform not 
only the Sino-Brazilian relationship, but also with the BRICS’ group members, through 
a series of annual meetings.  
 The BRICS represent the emergent countries that went through a quick process of 
development, and which also have an important role in contributing to a multipolar 
international scenario. The BRICS forum is a cooperative arrangement that reflects the 
position of the decision makers, considering those to be the ones who define strategies 
for acting, priorities, interests, and threats. According to the data below, the Brazilian 
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commercial relationship with different countries in the last few years has been varied, and 
it is important to note the relevance of the commercial results with China:  
 
Table 3 – Commercial results between Brazil and the BRICS members (in millions 
of US$) 
Year China India Russia South Africa 
2005 6.300 -65 2.195 1.030 
2010 5.190 -750 2.242 557 
2011 11.526 -2.880 1.272 769 
2013 8.773 -3.227 298 1.117 
2014 3.722 -1.847 813 494 
Source: Baumann, 2015. 
   
For the administration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010), the trade 
relationship with China was one of its main policies goals and that was the country’s 
foreign policy orientation over the last two decades. Brazilian exports to China increased 
in the last ten years, with positive results for the trade balance. The main critique in the 
Becard article is “the difficulty faced by Brazil to diversify its exports and added value to 
their transactions with China” (Becard, 2013: 233), so Brazil mainly exports raw 
materials and this does not develop domestic industry by changing the focus to 
manufactured or semi-manufactured goods.   
 Despite the critiques of the Brazilian difficulty in diversifying its international 
economic participation through its commercial position - not only in its bilateral relations 
with China or under the multilateral structure of partnership - it is relevant to note that 
Brazil gained more international prestige. Brazil’s well-known diplomacy allowed the 
country to be in a prominent position in recent decades, and taking part in an international 
cooperative structure with global impacts only reaffirms its relevance. Besides Brazil and 
China having similar positions on the international agenda, the multilateral dialogue 
created an even better economic and political position for both.  
 As exposed by Arbache (2011), both countries have big internal challenges, such 
as poverty, inequality of distribution, regional disparities, and demographic problems. 
Brazil suffers with deficits in its current accounts; China has suffered from a shortage of 
resources, energy, and food, but their particularities boosted their willingness to cooperate 
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and achieve social progress. Arbache (2011) arguments can be reinforced by those from 
Becard (2013) about the assumption that Brazil should reformulate its strategic market 
position, in order to broaden its sectors and benefit itself through the partnership. 
 The Chinese presence in Latin America, and consequently in Brazil, has been 
growing over the years and all the initiatives for market diversification reflect the new 
challenges to be overcome by Brazilian decision makers. A large number of academic 
studies defend Brazil using its power of influence to guide the rules of the Sino-Brazilian 
relationship, in order to reaffirm its national interests and leaving behind its limited role 
as a raw products provider. Others affirm that trade should be more balanced, in a way 
that China could be more open to receiving other Brazilian products/services, including 
those associated with strategic companies in the defense sector. The investments should 
also be equal, so that Brazilian companies gain benefits and opportunities for growth as 
well (Arbache, 2011). In the opinion of Cunha (2017), the Sino-Brazilian relationship 
isn’t just based on commercial and investment trades; these areas are just a complement 
to a bigger joint plan. The capacity for scientific and technological cooperation between 
China and consequently extended to Latin America should not be underestimated.  
 The Sino-Brazilian model of cooperation established a new pattern of relations in 
the 2000s (South-South Cooperation), and the main area of development achieved was 
scientific and technological. The deepening of cooperation has come on many levels, and 
this represents a heterogeneous and multifaceted relationship. Also, it is worth 
mentioning that Brazil and China regional priorities do not overlap and are a possible way 
of considering security proximities or non-interference (Christensen, 2016). Considering 
all these dynamic relationships, it is crucial to deepen mutual knowledge, in order to 
obtain a more targeted strategy. There is a mismatch of political architecture and the 
implementation of agreements. As noted in Table 1, only a few agreements were 
promulgated in the area of defense. This represents a distance between what is planned 
and what is really executed. According to Barbosa (2017), is necessary to study the 
commercial strategy between both countries, define each’s national interest, and promote 
more high-level dialogue in order to achieve a profound mutual knowledge. 
 
Final remarks 
Incentives that were part of a series of combined policies were the main reason for the 
establishment of renewed ways of dealing internationally in both the Chinese and 
Brazilian cases. In this sense, Brazilian incentives were markedly based on the inclusion 
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of the defense sector in a broader development policy, as well as on a cycle of investments 
which was put into force together with the amplification of the state’s cooperation ties 
with China. Alongside the stimulus on new cooperation fronts, there are motivations for 
rebuilding old structures in renewed ways.  
Observing the on-going plans on development, there is space for a coordination 
with win-win outputs, using gaps and the reallocation of resources to benefit both China 
and Brazil. The defiance in creating alternatives to the main players and provoking change 
in old and recent relations seems to be the new paradigm in place. Conversely, 
infrastructure plans were guided based on the defense sector’s structure in China, whereas 
in Brazil it was a consequence of the whole development policies. Even though some of 
the most important Brazilian infrastructure companies were also willing to participate in 
the country defense’s window of opportunity, in fact, there was not a trusting connection 
in the long-term and in between the sectors, in Brazil. Conversely, China had done a long-
term plan as part of its development goals, that could, finally, permit new arrangements 
to the benefit of bilateral relations with Brazil. And that is why infrastructure is achievable 
and interfaces with Brazilian defense planning.  
Notably in this bilateral relationship, various opportunities and synergies that are 
being aligned to benefit the already developed individual purposes can be seen. Even 
though geographical, cultural, and institutional proximity may provoke some barriers, 
Santoro (2012) points out that Brazilian foreign policy has maintained caution in respect 
to themes on the (non)democratic practices of its partners. It is, nonetheless, another 
avenue to explore and, inside the BRICS umbrella, it is far more likely to happen in terms 
of a bilateral approach using the financial mechanisms combined with those BRICS 
instruments to make it happen at a good pace. To be feasible, then, Brazil and China must 
deal with different managing capacities to enhance this formula, as imbalanced sources 
and investment strengths have to be considered.  
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